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Chapter I – Background Information 
	  
1.1 – Introduction 
 
Submarine intrusions were a major security issue for several coastal states in the aftermath 
of World War II and during the Cold War. Recent incidents suggest that this might not 
only be a problem that belongs to the past. How may then a coastal State defend itself 
against such intrusions? Is the coastal State entitled to use force? If yes, do human rights 
influence the legality of the use of force? These are questions that require a further analysis 
in light of the recent submarine incidents.  
 
The topic of this thesis is inspired by what occurred in the Swedish territorial sea in 
October 2014. What is likely to have been a submarine was spotted several times in the 
Skjaergaard of Stockholm. Sweden used a lot of resources and non-lethal measures to 
locate the intruder, without any success. 1 A similar incident occurred in Finland, where a 
submarine was spotted close to the Finnish capital Helsinki in April 2015. 2 
 
In the aftermath of Sweden’s unsuccessful operation in October 2014, a debate arose in 
Sweden on the authorization to use potentially lethal force against submarines. Some legal 
scholars have argued that Sweden was allowed to use potentially deadly force in order to 
force the submarine up to the surface3. Sweden, on the other hand, seems to have 
intentionally avoided the use of potentially lethal force in respect of human rights, as 
contained in ECHR, with heavy emphasis placed upon the right to life.4 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2014/10/underrattelseoperationen-avslutad/ 
(Last accessed 15 August 2015). 
2http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/finland/11568042/Finland-fires-
warning-shots-at-foreign-submarine-near-Helsinki.html (Last accessed 20 August 2015). 
3 http://www.svd.se/tvist-om-marinen-far-anvanda-dodligt-vald_4501740 (Last accessed 
10 August 2015). 
4 Id.	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Sweden’s reaction to the submarine intrusion indicates that the right of a coastal State to 
protect itself against submerged submarines in its maritime zones must be balanced against 
the right to life of the individuals operating the submarines. 
 
1.2 – The relationship between the law of the sea and human rights. 
 
The Law of the Sea is one of the oldest branches of international law. 5 By the work Mare 
Liberum written by Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century, the freedom of the seas-
doctrine arose. As “the oceans have been and continue to be fundamental to human life”, 6 
the development of the modern law of the sea has moved away from this doctrine and into 
a regime of creeping coastal State jurisdiction. This development provides the coastal 
states with greater powers to limit the freedoms of the seas.  
 
The primary function of the law of the sea is the spatial distribution of jurisdiction to 
sovereign coastal states by “dividing the ocean into multiple jurisdictional zones”. 7 In 
these different zones, the coastal State and third states are granted different rights and 
obligations. The State’s sovereignty decreases as the distance to the coast is increasing.  
 
The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC),8 negotiated and adopted at UNCLOS III, is often 
referred to as the “Constitution of the oceans” and as a framework Convention. With its 
320 Articles, it is recognized as one of the most comprehensive legal Conventions of all 
time.  
 
Even though the LOSC is considered a comprehensive framework convention, it is not “a 
human rights instrument per se”. 9  Its main objective is to provide a legal order of the 
oceans. Yet, it includes provisions concerning human beings. 10 “As human activities in the 
oceans…are not free from risk, elements of humanity must be taken into account in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Tullio Treves, “Human rights and law of the sea,” Berkeley Journal of international law 
28 (2010): 1-14, 1. 
6 Yoshufumi. Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012,) 3. 
7Ibid, 4. 
8 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 1833 UNTS 397. 
9 Treves (2010), 3. 
10Id.	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application of the law of the sea”. 11 By virtue of Article 293(1) of the LOSC, 12 the 
Convention “includes international law in general terms in its provision concerning the 
applicable law”.13 Thus, “it could hardly be said that the law of the sea is indifferent to 
human rights, human rights being to some extent one of its interpretative guidelines”. 14 
 
International human rights law developed mainly in the aftermath of the atrocities 
committed during World War II. Its main function is to provide rights to individuals 
typically within the jurisdiction of the states. One of the major human rights instruments is 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 15 and with all 47 member states of 
the Council of Europe ratifying and accepting the rights and freedoms contained in the 
Convention, over 800 million people are currently protected by it. 16 As individual human 
rights may conflict with the rights of the coastal states under the law of the sea, it is clear 
that the two legal systems in some cases might overlap. An illustrative example of such an 
overlap is the use of potentially lethal force against submarines.  
 
The role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is to “interpret and apply the 
Convention”.17 Its “principal role is to pronounce on applications, brought both by 
individuals and states under the European Convention on Human Rights”.18 The Court’s 
decisions are final19 and the parties “undertake to abide by the final judgement of the Court 
in any case to which they are parties”. 20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Tanaka (2012), 16. 
12 In Article 293 of the LOSC, it is stated that ”[a] court or tribunal having jurisdiction 
under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not 
incompatible with this Convention”. 
13 Stefano Dominelli, ”Human Rights at SEA: Does the Law of the Sea Clash with Well-
Established Human Rights Principles?” in Jurisdiction and Control at Sea: Some 
Environmental and Security Issues, ed Gemma Andreone (Napoli: Giannini editore, 
Marsafenet, 2014): 127-151, 131. 
14 Ibid, 134. 
15 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 1950, ETS 5.  
16 David Harris, et al, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Third Edition), (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014,) 4. 
17 ECHR Article 32 (1). 
18 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The 
European Convention on Human Rights – sixth edition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014,) 21. 
19 ECHR Article 44. 
20 ECHR Article 46(1).	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In the 1978 Tyrer case, the Court stated that “[t]he Court must also recall that the 
Convention is a living instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions”.21 This “living instrument”-doctrine has 
three main features. First, the Court will take into account present day conditions. Thus, 
the Court rarely looks at the intention of the negotiating states in relation to the Articles of 
the ECHR when it is interpreting its provisions. Hence, the preparatory works can be 
invoked as “a general guide to the general intentions of the Contracting Parties, rather than 
to delimit strictly the scope of particular Articles”.22 Second, the “present-day standards 
that the Court takes into consideration must somehow be common or shared amongst 
contracting states”.23 This is evident due to the merits of the M.C v. Bulgaria case, where 
the Court analyzes the provisions concerning rape in the domestic law of several European 
counties in order to establish how the consent to sexual intercourse must be given. 24 Third, 
“the Court will not assign decisive importance to what the respondent state…considers to 
be accepted standards in the case at hand”.25 The reasoning behind this is that the 
respondent State might have standards that are too low to meet the criterions established in 
light of present-day conditions. 
 
1.3 – Research question and objective of the thesis 
 
The objective of this thesis will be to discuss the following research questions:  
 
• What are the regulations on the use of force in the Law of the Sea? 
• How are the regulations on the use of force in the Law of the Sea applied in the 
case of submarines? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom. Application No. 5856/72, Chamber judgement of 
25.04.1978, para 31. 
22Rainey, Wicks and Ovey (2014), 67. See also Njål Høstmælingen, Internasjonale 
Menneskerettigheter (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2003,) 90. 
23 George Letsas, ”The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy”, in 
Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in National, European and 
Global Context, ed. Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012,) 106-141, 108. 
24 M.C v. Bulgaria, Application no. 39272/98, Chamber judgement of 04.12.2003 paras 90- 
100. 
25 Letsas (2012), 109.	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• Does the individual right to life under the European Convention on Human Rights 
constitute a limitation on such use of force? 
 
Even though the three questions are different in nature, they all constitute fundamental 
parts of the main research question, namely: 
 
• Does the coastal State have a right to use potentially lethal force against 
submarines in its internal waters and its territorial sea? 
 
1.4– Scope and outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis will address the authorization and the limitation on the right to use force against 
submarines during times of peace. As the use of force naturally generate questions 
belonging to the law of armed conflicts, it is necessary to mention that this aspect of the 
use of force will not be dealt with in this thesis. The scope of the thesis thus contains the 
use of force in light of the relevant framework within the law of the sea and human rights 
law.  
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The introduction and general background 
information is provided in Chapter I. In Chapter II, I will explain the different relevant 
regimes within the law of the sea, in order to place the subject matter in a wider context. 
 
Chapter III addresses the regulation of the use of force in the law of the sea.  Furthermore, 
Chapter IV addresses the use of force and human rights.  
 
In Chapters V and VI, I will address the use of potentially lethal force against submarines 
and provide the conclusions of the main research question.  
 
1.5 – Legal sources and methodology 
 
In considerations of the outlined objectives of the thesis, the relevant legal sources are 
typically found within the law of the sea itself. Special consideration will then be given to 
the LOSC and customary international law elaborating on the LOSC. But as the law of the 
	   6	  
sea cannot be considered as a separate branch of international law, other fields of law also 
apply. This thesis will therefore also look at the authorization and limitations on the use of 
potentially lethal force against submarines found in the ECHR.  
 
The legal sources will be interpreted and applied with a revised positivistic methodology.  
This methodology is based on summarization of “theories that focus upon describing the 
law as it is backed up by effective sanctions, with reference to formal criteria, 
independently of moral or ethical considerations”. 26  Furthermore, the legal sources will be 
identified in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
27 whereas the method for analyzing treaties will be in accordance with the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),28 especially Article 31(1)(a), where it is stated 
that a treaty shall be interpreted in "good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning...in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose". 
 
The research questions raised in this thesis create several challenges. First, there are few 
sources dealing with the authorization on the use of force against submarines. This specific 
challenge will require the writer to undertake independent and critical thinking when the 
research questions in this thesis are discussed. Second, as there are few written sources on 
the subject matter, special considerations must be given to the development of customary 
international law. This means that the LOSC will have to be interpreted in light of 
customary law throughout the thesis. The challenges with thoroughly identifying the 
relevant State practice and opinio juris require extensive work which might be hard to fit 
within the time and length requirements of a masters thesis.  Thus, judicial literature will 
be applied to a great extent when the writer is trying to identify the customary law on the 
use of force against submarines. Selected state practice will nevertheless be more closely 
examined. Third, this customary law must be balanced against the rights contained in the 
ECHR. This creates a difficult legal scenario, as the LOSC and customary international 
law developed in the law of the sea must be balanced against the ECHR and the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of the Convention. Furthermore, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT states that 
“any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Steven R. Rather and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ”Appraising the methods of international 
law: A prospectus for readers,” American Journal of International Law 93 (1999), 1-21, 4. 
27 Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945, 
1 UNTS XVI. 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.	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must be taken into account. Thus, the interplay between the two different legal regimes 
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Chapter II – Territorial sovereignty of the coastal State 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with the relevant rules governing the 
obligations and rights of the coastal State in its internal waters and territorial sea.  
Furthermore, the regime of innocent passage will be explained and discussed. Finally, the 
reader will be provided with the obligations of states operating with submarines, and the 
legal regime concerning submarines in the internal waters and territorial seas.  
 
2.1 – The coastal State’s jurisdiction over foreign vessels in its internal waters 
 
It is a general view that “internal waters form an integral part of the territory of a coastal 
State”. 29 This indicates that the coastal State in this maritime area normally exercises the 
same legal regime as it does within its land territory. Thus, the regime of internal waters is 
merely touched upon in the legal framework related to the law of the sea.  
 
The spatial scope of the territorial sea is defined by the baselines measured by the coastal 
State.  The baseline is the line from which the outer limits of the territorial sea and other 
maritime zones are measured. 30 In accordance with Articles 5 and 7 of the LOSC, two 
different methods for the construction of such baselines are identified in the Convention.  
 
The primary method of measuring the baselines is to apply the rule of normal baselines 
contained in Article 5. This is also explicitly stated by the wording “except where 
otherwise provided in this Convention”. Furthermore, the normal baseline “is the low-
water line along the coast”.31 As the internal waters are recognized as part of a state’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Haijiang Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in 
Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea (Berlin: Springer, 2005,) 45. 
30 R.R Churchill and A.V Lowe, The law of the sea–third edition, (New York: Juris 
Publishing, 1999) 31. 
31 In the Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
recognized the use of straight baselines. As a direct result of the judgement, Article 7 of 
the LOSC forms an exception from Article 5 and enables the coastal states to draw straight 
baselines where the criteria listed in the Article are met. That the coastal states are 
empowered to draw straight baselines where this is reasonable due to special geographical 
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territory, the coastal State has “sovereignty over those waters fully encompassing 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction”. 32 By entering the internal waters of a coastal 
State, vessels have thus accepted to be subject to the laws and regulations of the State.  
 
When the baselines are established, one can identify the spatial scope of the internal 
waters. In accordance with Article 8 of the LOSC, the internal waters are recognized as 
being the “waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea”.  Internal 
waters embrace “different kinds of natural waters or artificial waterways of a state”. 33 This 
naturally includes “lakes, rivers, bays, gulfs, estuaries, creeks, ports and canals”. 34 
 
Yet another evidence of the sovereignty of the coastal State is the lack of any right of 
innocent passage for foreign vessels through internal waters. The only exception to this 
rule is found in Article 8(2) of the LOSC, where it is stated that “[w]here the establishment 
of a straight baseline…. has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not 
previously been considered as such”, the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels still 
exist. Furthermore, the right of passage seems to exist where a situation of force majeure 
occurs.  
 
In its internal waters, a coastal State is entitled to protect itself against potential threats. 
This is most evident due to the fact that the coastal State in certain situations is entitled to 
close its ports to foreign vessels. The right to such protection was recognized in the 1958 
Saudi-Arabia v. Aramco arbitration, where the arbitral award stated that “[a]ccording to a 
great principle of public international law, the ports of every State must be open to foreign 
merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital interests of the State so require”. 35 
Measures may thus be undertaken “to safeguard good order on shore, to signal political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
features must be said to create a flexible and equitable system in the law of the sea. See 
Anglo-Norwegian fisheries, UK v. Norway, Order, 1951, ICJ 117 (Jan. 18). 
32 D Rothwell and T. Stevens, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010) 54. See also N. Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) 65. 
33 Rainer Lagoni, “Internal Waters,” in Encylopedia of Public International Law II, ed. 
Rudolf Berhardt (Heidelberg, 1995): 1034-1036, 1034.  
34 Yang (2005), 47. 
35 Saudi-Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) 1963, in G. Brugmann, 
Access to Maritime Ports (Norderstedt: Books on demand, 2003) 1.	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displeasure or to defend vital interests”. 36 One “vital interest” recognized in this matter is 
the protection of public safety, 37 which might apply when a foreign submarine is operating 
in the internal waters without consent. On the other hand, ports are recognized to lie under 
the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State. Thus, the State may be entitled to “regulate 
foreign vessels’ entry to its ports”38 and close the ports in any matter. However, it seems 
clear that the coastal State is entitled to close its ports when it considers this to be a 
necessary measure.  
 
It is clear that the security need of the coastal State in its internal waters enables it to take 
measures to protect itself. What these measures might include will be discussed in chapter 
III.  
 
The maritime zone adjacent to the internal waters is the territorial sea. It is necessary to 
define the legal and spatial scope of the territorial sea in order to explain the authorization 
of the use of force by the coastal State within this maritime area.  
  
2.2 – The coastal State’s jurisdiction over foreign vessels in its territorial sea 
 
The territorial sea is, like the internal waters, under the territorial sovereignty of the coastal 
State. That the territorial sea is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State is evident due 
to the wording of Article 2 of the LOSC. Here, it follows that “[the sovereignty of the 
coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters…to an adjacent belt of 
sea, described as the territorial sea”. 
 
Further, in the 1909 Grisbadara case, the arbitral award stated that “the maritime territory 
is an essential appurtenance of land territory” and that this area is “an inseparable 
appurtenance of this land territory”. ”39 These statements emphasise the legal status of the 
territorial sea, long before the adoption of the LOSC. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Klein, Natalie. Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011,) 67. 
37 De La Fayette, “Access to ports in International Law,” in The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 11 (1996): 1-22, in N. Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of 
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38 Tanaka (2012), 80.	  	  
39 Grisbadarna Case (Norway v. Sweden), Award of 23 October 1909, 4. 
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In Article 3 of the LOSC, the spatial scope of the territorial sea is defined. In accordance 
with the provision, “every State has the right to establish the breath of the territorial sea up 
to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the baselines”. 40 Further, the 
sovereignty of the coastal State extends to the seabed and subsoil below and the airspace 
above the territorial sea.41 Because of the proximity to the coast, it is evident that a lot of 
maritime activities are undertaken by the coastal State in its territorial sea. 42 
 
Besides being a maritime area where coastal states are entitled to enjoy their freedom of 
sovereignty, the territorial sea is also “an area of considerable security sensitivity for 
coastal States”. 43 This is emphasised by the historical background of the territorial sea, 
where its main function was to provide the states with protection against hostile activities 
and intruders. 44  
 
Even though the LOSC recognizes the sovereignty of a coastal State over its territorial 
seas, an exception from these rights is recognized by the regime of innocent passage. The 
regime of innocent passage thus constitutes one example where the LOSC balances 
different rights and obligations. On this specific subject matter, the right of navigation 
must be balanced against the rights of the coastal State. One must take a closer look at how 
the right of innocent passage is affecting the interests of the coastal State, among them the 
right of security and protection.  
 
The “coastal State’s sovereignty over the territorial sea is restricted by the right of innocent 
passage for foreign vessels”. 45 Innocent passage can thus be said to constitute a major 
exception to the coastal State’s right to enjoy unfettered and unlimited rights and powers in 
its territorial sea. It must be determined what constitutes “passage” in accordance with the 
LOSC.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See the definition of baselines in chapter 2.1. 
41 LOSC Article 2 (2).  
42 Rothwell and Stevens (2010), 58. 
43Id. 
44http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.h
tm (Last accessed 10 August 2015).  
45 Tanaka (2012), 85.	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The definition of “passage” can be found in Article 18(1), and encompasses both lateral 
and vertical passage.46 Lateral passage is defined in Article 18(1)(a), which states; 
“Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of traversing that sea 
without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal 
waters”.  Vertical passage includes both inwards and outbound navigation and is defined as 
passage where the vessel is “proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such 
roadstead or port facility” in Article 18(1)(b) in the LOSC.  
 
In Article 18(2) it is further stated that passage shall be continuous and expeditious, but the 
passage includes stopping or anchoring if this is necessary due to navigation or in cases of 
force majeure.  
 
Due to the right of navigation, the coastal State must accept and tolerate certain activities 
by foreign flagged vessels in its territorial sea. The duties of the coastal State in this regard 
are stated in Article 24 of the LOSC. In accordance with Article 24, the coastal State is 
deprived of the ability to interfere with the passage except in the cases where such 
interference is recognized in the LOSC, UN Security Council resolutions, etc.  
 
Several exceptions from the abovementioned duty of the coastal State are nevertheless 
found in Article 19 of the LOSC, which states that “passage is innocent as long as it isn’t 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state”. The Article then lists 
activities that render passage non-innocent in number 2.  
 
In accordance with the Convention, “only activities are here of relevance”. 47 The list of 
activities is long, and is not intended to be exhaustive due to the wording of Article 19(2) 
letter l. Also activities besides those expressly mentioned, which have no “direct bearing 
on passage”, may be considered prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State”,48 and may thus render the passage “non-innocent”. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Id. 
47 K Hakapaä and E J Molenaar, “Innocent Passage – Past and Present,” Marine Policy 23 
(1999): 131-145, 132. 
48 Id.	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With the wording contained in Article 19, two specific questions arises; can passage be 
considered non-innocent on the sole basis of its first paragraph and what activity in 
paragraph 2 is applicable in the case of submarines? I will start by addressing the first 
question.  
 
If paragraph 2 of Article 19 is considered to be an illustrative list of paragraph 1, then 
paragraph 1 may be regarded as superfluous. 49 Further, Article 19(1) doesn’t mention 
“activities” as a criterion. Thus, it is possible to argue that a ship can be in “non-innocent” 
passage, even though it is not conducting any activities in the territorial sea of the coastal 
State.  
 
On the other hand, the regime of innocent passage was negotiated and adopted on the basis 
of the freedom of navigation by several maritime states. If Article 19(1) arguably can be 
considered as a sufficient legal basis for rendering passage “non-innocent”, this would 
constitute a major impact on the abovementioned freedom. Thus, the coastal State would 
be granted more jurisdiction in its territorial sea than it was intended to have in the first 
place.  
 
Tanaka nevertheless seems to argue that Article 19(1) can be used on its own to render 
passage “non-innocent”. The argument is based on the fact that “the Japanese government 
takes the view that the passage of foreign warships carrying nuclear weapons through its 
territorial sea is not innocent, whilst Japan generally admits the right of innocent passage 
of foreign warships”. 50  As a curiosity, it should be emphasised that this view doesn’t seem 
to be shared by Russia and the US. These countries do not recognize the right to apply 
article 19(1) as an independent source for this purpose.51 This seems to be based on the 
argument that the freedom of navigation prevails where the opposite is not explicitly 
recognized in Article 19(2).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Tanaka (2012), 87. 
50 Id. 
51 ”A ship passing through the territorial sea that does not engage in any of those activities 
[listed in Article 19(2)] is in innocent passage”. 1989 USA-USSR Joint Statement on the 
Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, 
published by Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin 14, 
December 1989, available at: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulE14.pdf	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It might seem that Article 19(1) can be interpreted to be independent from the list of 
activities in article 19(2).  Thus, the conclusion must be that passage can be considered as 
non-innocent solely on the basis of Article 19(1).  
 
The next question that must be addressed is whether some of the activities listed in Article 
19(2) are applicable in the case of submarines.  
 
Depending on the purpose of the passage through the territorial sea of the coastal State, 
several of the activities listed in Article 19(2) might apply in the case of submarines.  
 
Of special interest in the case of submarines is Article 19(2)(a), which states that passage is 
non-innocent if the vessel engages in activities that cause “any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal 
State”.52 A natural interpretation of the wording “any”, means that all potential threats 
constituted by the foreign flagged submarine may render the passage “non-innocent”. 
However, it must be emphasised that the threat must be based on the use of force. If a 
submarine is only conducting research or survey activities, its activities cannot 
automatically be regarded as a threat of the use of force. Such activities would instead fall 
under the scope of article 19(2)(j).53 That also litra j is of special interest in the case of 
submarines is due to the fact that ”within foreign territorial sea areas there exists a general 
prohibition of ’research or survey activities”.54 Furthermore, there is a prohibition of “any 
exercise or practice with weapons of any kind”,55 and “any act aimed at collecting 
information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State”56 during 
passage in foreign territorial seas. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See also the UN Charter Article 2(4), where it is stated that ”[m]embers shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state”. 
53 In Article 19 (j) it is stated that passage is non-innocent if the vessel is engaging in “the 
carrying out of research or survey activities”.  
54 Wolff Heintschel Von Heinegg, ”Submarine Operations and International Law”, in Law 
at war – The Law as it was and the Law as it Should Be: Amicorum Ove Bring, ed. Ola 
Engedahl and Pål Wrange, (The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill BV, 2008), 141-161, 147.  
55 Article 19(2)(b). 
56 Article 19(2)(c).	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By virtue of the second paragraph of Article 19, several security interests of the coastal 
State are recognized. While several provisions in the LOSC acknowledge the freedom of 
navigation in the territorial sea, it is also providing the coastal State protection against 
hostile activities affecting its security. While it might seem like the regime of innocent 
passage is limiting the coastal State’s right to protection at first, it must be emphasised that 
the second paragraph is providing the coastal State’s with the right to take action against 
certain activities that is rendering passage non-innocent.  
 
It seems like both the first and the second paragraph of Article 19 can be applied to render 
passage non-innocent. However, due to the scope of this thesis only Article 19(2) will be 
continuously linked towards the discussions.  
 
2.3 – Obligations and rights of States operating with submarines 
 
As recognized in Article 17 of the LOSC, “ships of all States…enjoy the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea”. A natural interpretation of the provision thus reaffirms 
that also submarines enjoy the right of innocent passage.  
 
However, in accordance with Article 20, states operating with submarines are “required to 
navigate on the surface and to show their flag”. The rule was first adopted in Article 14(6) 
the 1958 Geneva Convention.57 The reasoning behind the rule originating in the 1920s 
was, among others, that “since navigational laws are universally framed upon the theory of 
surface navigation” the submarine entering the territorial sea of a coastal State “in time of 
peace may be properly required to remain upon the surface, so that it may conform to the 
accepted standards of safety to navigation”. 58  The idea of navigational security further 
developed as Diena in 1925 argued, “the coastal State could not verify the pacific character 
of the passage unless the submarine was on the surface”. 59  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958, 516 UNTS 205. 
58 D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Volume 1, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982) 294. 
59 Diena, 32 Annuaire (1925), page 524, cited in D.P O’Connell The International Law of 
the Sea Volume 1, 295.	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During the negotiations of UNCLOS III, the protection of the passage rights of submarines 
was a critical concern for the United States and the former Soviet Union due to strategic 
concerns. 60 However, the argument that submarines might pose a serious danger to the 
security of the coastal State outweighed the right to operate with submarines in their 
normal submerged mode in the territorial sea of a foreign coastal State.61   
  
With the requirement to navigate on the surface, now embodied in Article 20 of the LOSC, 
two specific questions arises; Is a breach of the requirement to navigate on the surface a 
negation of the right of innocent passage and to what extent can the coastal State use force 
to prevent passage which it considers “non-innocent”? 
 
As discussed above in chapter 2.3, the security interests of the coastal State provide for 
specific obligations affecting states operating submarines. As this obligation, requiring the 
submarine to navigate on the surface and show its flag, is contained in a separate provision 
of the LOSC, it must be examined whether or not a breach of this obligation will render the 
passage “non-innocent” in accordance with Article 19.  
 
On the one hand, the drafters of the LOSC “could easily included [Article 20] in the…list 
of non-innocent activities. The failure to do so indicates the drafters’ intentions not to 
make surface operation a requirement of innocence for submarines”.62  
 
On the other hand, Tanaka argues that “it seems that a submerged submarine in the 
territorial sea is not considered as innocent passage”. 63 Fitzmaurice further argues that “a 
submarine that traverses the territorial sea submerged or not showing her flag may possibly 
not be in innocent passage, but this will not be because she is submerged or not showing 
her flag”. 64 In order words, it seems that submerged passage is not an activity that renders 
passage non-innocent in it self.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Klein (2011), 42. 
61 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea Vol. 3, UN Doc A/Conf. 13/C.1/SR.36-40,  
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62 David Froman, ”Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent passage of Warships in the Territorial 
Sea,” San Diego Law Review 21 (1984): 625-681, 663. 
63 Tanaka (2012), 87. 
64 G. Fitzmaurize, “Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea”, 
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Following the line of the arguments made by Tanaka, it seems logical to argue that 
submerged passage in the territorial sea will be contrary to the abovementioned letters 
contained in Article 19(2) of the LOSC.65 As a submarine naturally constitutes a 
potentially serious danger to the coastal State’s security, submerged passage can be seen as 
a threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of those states. The legal basis for 
this argument is that “the maritime territory is an essential appurtenance of land territory”66 
and that the coastal State in this maritime zone enjoys sovereignty.  
 
In this regard, the obligations contained in Article 20 must be viewed separately from 
Article 19 of the Convention. It is thus clear that it is not the violation of Article 20 in itself 
that render the passage “non-innocent”, but the nature of the submarine and its normal 
activities.67  
 
Another argument that can be raised on the subject matter is that it would be impossible for 
the coastal State to verify that the submarine is in innocent passage while it is not 
navigating on the surface. As submerged passage naturally restricts the coastal states 
opportunity to verify whether or not the passage is innocent, the submarine can presumably 
be considered to not exercise its right of innocent passage in this circumstances.  
 
As passage cannot be considered innocent in the territorial sea for a submerged submarine 
due to its nature, it is clear that the coastal State may be entitled to take measures to 
prevent such passage. In this regard, a brief introduction of the rights of the coastal State to 
prevent non-innocent passage is in place.  
 
The right to protection of the coastal State is contained in Article 25 of the LOSC. The 
provision states that “[t]he coastal Stare may take necessary steps in its territorial sea to 
prevent passage which is not innocent”. The Article functions as the legal basis for a 
justified reaction against a submerged submarine, as it is not considered as enjoying the 
right of innocent passage.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Articles 19(2)(a), 19(2)(b), 19(2)(c) and 19(2)(j).  
66 Grisbadarna Case (Norway v. Sweden), 4. 
67 This view doesn’t seems to be supported by the US Department of the Navy, which 
simply states that ”a vessel does not enjoy the right of innocent passage if, in the case of a 
submarine, it navigates submerged.” The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations (July 2007,) Section 2.5.2.1.	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Article 25 is broadly defined and thus leaves a wide margin of discretion to the coastal 
State when it decides what constitutes “necessary steps”. By virtue of the wording, the 
provision “gives to the coastal State considerable scope of variety of responses depending 
on the circumstances”. 68 Necessary steps “could include an exchange of communications 
requesting a delinquent ship to refrain from certain acts, a request that the ship leave the 
territorial sea immediately, [or] the positioning of vessels to prevent the ship from 
continuing its passage”. 69 A common aspect for all these “steps” is that they do not 
including force against the foreign vessel.  
 
Furthermore, Rothwell and Stevens state that “necessary steps” could include “the use of 
armed force” when a ship is posing a threat to the coastal State.70 
 
The LOSC does not define the scope of measures that can be undertaken by the coastal 
State for its own protection. Rothwell and Stevens argues that it thus “goes to the question 
of State sovereignty and how a State may choose to protect itself from what may be 
perceived or actually is, a threat”.71  
 
As a submarine can be said to pose a threat of force to the territorial integrity of the coastal 
State affected, it may be implied that the threshold for the use of actual force might be 
lower in such circumstances. This leads to my first research question: The regulations and 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	   19	  
 
Chapter III – The regulation of the use of force in the Law of the Sea 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the authorization to use force in the 
law of the sea. The right of the coastal State to use force against submarines in “non-
innocent” passage and in its internal waters will furthermore be examined. 
 
As a starting point it must be emphasised that the LOSC was adopted with several 
provisions that underlines that the oceans shall be used for peaceful purposes. The most 
prominent Articles in this regard are Article 88, which purpose is to reserve the high seas 
for peaceful purposes, and Article 301, which emphasises that the rights and obligations in 
the Convention shall be used for peaceful purposes. The Articles are essentially 
reaffirming Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,72 which embodies the principle of prohibition 
of the threat or use of force. Furthermore, the preamble of LOSC states that the Convention 
will “promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans”. Thus, in light of both the LOSC 
and the UN Charter, the starting point is that both the rights and obligations of states 
operating submarines, and coastal states seeking protection from intrusion by such vessels, 
are subject to the obligation to reserve the use of the ocean for peaceful purposes. In 
relation to the coastal states, this obligation is naturally modified by the threats potentially 
posed by the submarines.   
 
3.1 – The Law of the Sea Convention  
 
The LOSC does not contain any specific provisions regulating the use of force that can be 
undertaken by the coastal states when they seek to prevent passage, which is not innocent. 
As the LOSC is silent on the matter, “a permissible response would ultimately depend 
upon the circumstances”. 73 As the circumstances may vary, it seems hard to establish the 
threshold for what use of force may be legally applied by the coastal State in accordance 
with the LOSC.  Thus, several incidents of the use of force have been considered by both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Charter of the United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  
73 Rothwell and Stevens (2010), 218.	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ITLOS and other dispute settlement mechanisms. In order to establish what measures may 
be legally applied by the coastal State, one must take a closer look at the case law. 
 
3.2 - The development of case law 
 
In the pre-LOSC “judgements of the S.S I’m Alone case from 1935, and the Red Crusader 
case from 1962, only a vague sketch was given of the legal use of force”74 under the law of 
the sea regime. 
 
In the first case, the vessel I’m Alone was engaged in smuggling liquor into the United 
States. As the vessel refused to stop, a US coastguard cutter pursued the vessel onto the 
high seas. While still in hot pursuit, another cutter joined the pursuit. The I’m alone was 
sunk on the high seas by the revenue cutter. The arbitrators stated that “if sinking should 
occur incidentally, as a result of the exercise of necessary and reasonable force for such 
purpose…the pursuing vessel might be entirely blameless”. 75  While recognizing that the 
use of force might be legal in certain circumstances, the use of force would still be subject 
to the test of necessity and reasonableness. The Arbitrators found that this test was not 
fulfilled in the specific case and thus stated that “the admittedly intentional sinking of the 
suspected vessel was not justified”. 76 
 
In the Red Crusader case the arbitral award considered the legality of the firing of 
weapons, even aimed shots, against a foreign ship. A Danish fishery protection vessel put a 
boarding crew abroad the UK flagged Red Crusader. The boarding crew was detained and 
the vessel attempted to escape to the high seas. The pursuing vessel fired warning shots 
across the bow and stern of the UK flagged vessel, and then directed a round of solid shot 
at its radar scanner and lights. The Danish fishery protection vessel was found to have 
“exceeded legitimate use of armed force” as it fired a round of solid gun without first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Magne Frostad, “Anti-Piracy and the use of force: The Cohabitation of the United 
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75 S.S ”I’m Alone” (Canada v. United States) in United Nations, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, Vol. III (New York: 2006), 1609-1618, 1615. 
76 Id. 
	   21	  
having cautioned that such force would be used unless the vessel stopped.  Furthermore, 
the Danish vessel created danger to human life without any proved necessity, as it had not 
attempted other means before firing at the Red Crusader. 77  
 
The two pre-LOSC cases illustrates that the use of force must be “necessary” and 
“reasonable”. The criterion of necessity reflects that the circumstances must be serious and 
that other measures cannot be used to achieve the same results as the use of force.  
The criterion of reasonableness indicates that even though “the force may be necessary, it 
might nevertheless fail to be reasonable”.78 Thus, the criterion may be used to censure 
force that is fulfilling the requirements of being “necessary”.79 The test of 
“reasonableness” thus points towards an assessment of proportionality.  
 
Some post-LOSC cases have also dealt with the use of force against foreign vessels. The 
M/V Saiga (No. 2) case and the Guyana/Suriname case are here illustrative.  
 
In the M/V Saiga case (No.2), the Saiga was engaged in selling oil and serving as a 
bunkering vessel: It had served oil to three fishing vessels licensed by Guinea to fish in its 
EEZ. The refuelling occurred within Guineas EEZ and the vessel was the next day fired 
on, boarded and arrested by the Guinean authorities. Some of the crewmembers were hit 
and suffered injuries after the firing. The ITLOS observed that “the use of force must be 
avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is 
reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in 
the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law”. 80 
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Further, in the 2007 Guyana/Suriname case, the arbitral Tribunal accepted “the argument 
that in international law force may be used in law enforcement activities provided that such 
force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary”. 81    
 
As mentioned above, the two pre-LOSC cases recognize that the use of force must be 
“necessary” and “reasonable”. Noteworthy, a “third” criterion seems to have evolved in the 
aftermath of UNCLOS III.  
 
Both in the M/V Saiga (No.2) case and the Guyana/Suriname case, the adjudicating 
Tribunals make a reference to the criterion “unavoidable” when dealing with the merits. 
However, the reference made to “unavoidable” “should be seen as highlighting an aspect 
of the necessity principle”82. The criterion “unavoidable” seems to create a higher 
threshold for the use of force than the threshold previously established under the 
“necessity” criterion. A natural interpretation of the wording “unavoidable” indicates that 
all other reasonable measures must be implied before the use of force would be justified.  
 
The requirements of necessity and reasonableness, as developed in case law, can be seen as 
placing limitations upon the states when they are considering the use of force against 
foreign vessels. In order to comply with the law of the sea, states should refrain from the 
use of force if this is not strictly “necessary”, “reasonable” and “unavoidable”. What is 
clear is that these three criteria must be applied in the light of the circumstances faced by 
the State. The test of whether the criteria can justify the use of force is subject to 
verification by international courts and tribunals.  
 
It can be concluded that the two criteria also function as limitations upon the coastal State 
when dealing with submerged submarines in its internal waters and territorial sea. 
However, the threat against the territorial integrity, as discussed in chapter 2.3, could 
arguably lower the threshold for the use of force. It must then be examined what measures 
may be taken against submarines. 
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82 Frostad (2015), 208. 
	   23	  
3.3 – The case of submarines 
 
The use of foreign submarines in the internal waters and/or territorial seas of coastal states 
are not only a legal problem due to the recent incidents in the Swedish territorial sea. The 
adoption of Article 20 of the LOSC must naturally be seen as an attempt to prevent 
submerged activities. The adoption of the provision was important in light of the “incidents 
involving Soviet or unidentified submarines that have occurred…of the coast of several 
Western countries, such as Sweden, Norway and Italy”83 around the 1980’s.   
 
As the coastal State is unable to verify the activities of a submerged submarine, the 
potential threat posed by such activities is undisclosed. Examples of what activities the 
submarine may undertake include are “emplacement of electronic devices to monitor 
coastal military activities, laying of navigational buoys on the seabed to guide an attack, 
visual and electronic inspection of the coast in view of landing of special commando forces 
and covert mining of certain areas to prevent access or transit for enemy navies”. 84  
 
Thus, as the unauthorized presence of a foreign submarine in the area of internal waters 
“constitutes a prima facie violation of the coastal State’s territorial sovereignty, [it] is also 
significant in determining the range of coercive countermeasures that the coastal State may 
adopt against the foreign intruder”. 85  As the territorial sea is located within a State’s 
territory, it must be assumed that the statement also describes a violation of the sovereignty 
in cases where a submerged submarine enters the territorial sea. Tanaka argues that such 
countermeasures in the territorial sea should not “instantly justify the use of force against 
the submarine” when it is in breach of Article 20 of the LOSC. 86 It can be assumed that the 
same approach should be applied in the internal waters.  
 
Bearing in mind that potential force must be justified by “necessity”, “reasonableness” and 
be “unavoidable” in order to be in accordance with the law of the sea, all other measures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 F. Francesco, “Peacetime use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of the Sea,” 
Cornell International Law Journal 18 (1985): 203-226, 206.	  
84 Id. 
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must be exhausted before force is initiated by the coastal State. This entails that “every 
measures should be taken short of armed force to require the submarine to leave”.87 
 
It would seem reasonable that submerged passage in the internal waters and territorial sea 
is due to the submarine intentionally trying to avoid the attention of the coastal State. If the 
coastal State nevertheless is able to trace the submarine, it must request the submarine to 
leave before taking other measures. If the submarine fails to comply with this request, the 
coastal State is entitled to take further initiatives. Bearing in mind that force must be 
notified, as stated in the Red Crusader case, the coastal State may use force if also such 
warning is ignored by the submarine and the circumstances otherwise justifies a reaction. 
However, it must be emphasised that it might be hard or almost impossible to give a prior 
notification to a submarine that is trying to avoid the attention of the coastal State.88 This 
leads me to my second research question. It must be examined how the regulations of the 
use of force in the Law of the Sea apply in the case of submarines.  
 
3.3.1 – How are the regulations on the use of force in the Law of the Sea applied in the 
case of submarines? 
 
Previous incidents including submerged submarines indicate to what extent the coastal 
State may be entitled to use force to prevent submerged passage. Sadurska states that “[t]he 
extent of force a coastal State may use to prevent illicit submerged passage was 
highlighted by Sweden’s efforts to prevent a series of intrusions into its waters in 1982”. 89 
In the Hårsfjärden Event90 in 1982, the Swedish authorities authorized the use of depth 
charges in order to locate a submarine that was spotted close to one of its naval bases. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, 86, in D. P. O’Connell, The International Law 
of the Sea Volume 1, 297.	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89 R. Sadurska, “Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters: The Erosion of an International 
Norm”, 10 Yale Journal of International Law (1984): 34-76 in Klein, Maritime Security 
and the Law of the Sea, 42. 
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Several depth charges were dropped, but the submarine was not located. 91 As an 
immediate reaction to the increasing submarine intrusions, the Swedish government 
adopted new legislation to remedy its security concerns. 92 In the Ordinance, it is stated that 
in the internal waters, if a foreign submarine is found submerged, it shall be forced to the 
surface. 93 As the measures shall be used to force the submarine to the surface, the 
Ordinance differs from the use of force where the intention is to destroy the submarine in 
order to sink it. This indicates that the principle of reasonableness is applying and that such 
force thus might be in accordance with the customary international law developed in the 
law of the sea. This is due to the fact that the force is not exceeding what is considered as 
necessary to remedy the situation the State is facing.94 Furthermore, “if necessary, force of 
arms shall be used without prior warning”. 95 In the territorial sea, a submerged submarine 
“shall be turned away from the territory”. Also here, “if necessary, force of arms shall be 
used. Should special circumstances so require, the force of arms may be used without prior 
warning”. 96   
 
Interestingly, the world community accepted the adoption of section 15 of the Swedish 
Ordinance“, since “[n]o member of the international community protested the new 
Swedish Policy”97 after it was widely made public. 98 The lack of protests may indicate that 
the use of force against submarines, as contained in the Swedish legislation, has developed 
into customary international law. It must be emphasised that under normal circumstances, 
something more would be required for customary law to develop.99 For a custom to 
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develop, it must generally constitute ”two elements: state practice and opinio juris”.100 
However, the Swedish Ordinance lays down legislation that affects all coastal states, and it 
was widely made public without any protests. This may indicate that the lack of protests 
may be sufficient evidence for the development of customary law. The lack of response 
form the nations with great submarine fleets indicates a silent acceptance of the new 
rules.101  
 
Sadurska further argues that ”it must be assumed that international elites were aware that 
by tacitly approving of Swedish behaviour, they were acquiescing not only in a justified 
case of self-defence, but also in the erosion of a long-standing principle102 of international 
law”.103 The Swedish Ordinance has been changed multiple times since its adoption, but 
section 15 remains almost unchanged. This seems to indicate that the provision is still in 
force and applicable to submarine intrusions in Sweden’s territorial sea and internal waters.  
 
The significance of the acceptance of the Swedish practice is that a special legal regime for 
the use of force against submarines may have developed. Bring and Körlof-Askholt states 
that the Swedish Ordinance is in accordance with international law, and that force against 
submarines thus must be accepted in the prescribed circumstances.104 
 
The Danish fishery protection vessel was found to have “exceeded legitimate use of armed 
force” as it had not cautioned that force would be used against the vessel if it didn’t 
comply with the orders given in the Red Crusader case. 105 The criterion that prior 
notification must be given before the use of force is legitimate is thus departed from in the 
customary law on submarines developed in light of Sweden’s legislation. The reasoning 
behind this might be that it is hard or almost impossible to give a prior warning to a 
submerged submarine. However, the use of force without a prior notification may be 
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considered as legitimate means due to the fact that the flag states are made aware of the 
special regime that seems to have developed in the case of submarines. That force can be 
used without prior warning implies that the threshold for the use of force against 
submerged submarines is lower than against other foreign vessels located in the internal 
waters and the territorial sea.  
 
 As the Swedish legislation specifically mentions that force shall only be used when it is 
necessary, it is emphasised that the general rules for the use of force in the law of the sea 
nevertheless is not wholly disregarded in the case of submarines.  
 
As a curiosity, it must be mentioned that the criterion requiring that the use of force must 
be “unavoidable” was developed after the adoption of the Swedish Ordinance of 1983. The 
M/V Saiga case (No.2) case originates from 1999 and the Guyana/Suriname case was 
brought to adjunction in 2007. Thus, it is hard to clarify how the criterion would apply to 
new situations concerning submarine intrusions. On the one hand, the principle of lex 
posterior might be applied when interpreting the relevant rules governing the use of force 
against submarines. Thus, the criterion would limit the use of force in light of new case 
law. On the other hand, the wording in section 15 seems to imply that force against 
submarines is an exception to the original rules crystallized in the case law. As no prior 
notification is required, this would naturally affect the criterion of force having to be 
“unavoidable”. Thus, the special regime developed for submarines might “trump” the 
general rules established in the international law of the sea. 
 
The observations made in chapter 3 seem to affect the general rules concerning the use of 
force in the law of the sea. The test of whether the potential use of force is “necessary”, 
“reasonable” and “unavoidable” is thus modified in the case of submarines due to the 
development of customary international law specifically applicable to that type of vessel. 
 
Finally, as stated in the M/V Saiga (No.2) case, “considerations of humanity must apply in 
the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law”. 106 This leads me to my 
next research question. It must be examined if the individual right to life under the ECHR 
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Chapter IV – The right to life under the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Article 1 of the ECHR states that the parties shall “secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” in the Convention. The first guaranteed right is found 
in ECHR Article 2, which protects the right to life, and the right to life is recognized as 
“the most basic human right of all”.107 Further, Article 2 contains “one of the basic values 
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe”. 108  
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the relevant rules governing the rights and obligations 
of the states in light of the ECHR Article 2. Furthermore, the relationship between the law 
of the sea and the ECHR will be explained. Finally, the positive and negative obligations in 
Article 2 will be presented.   
 
4.1. – Scope of Application 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine whether a coastal State can use potentially lethal 
force against submarines in its internal waters and its territorial sea. As shown in chapter 
2.1 and 2.2, the coastal State exercises jurisdiction in these maritime zones within the law 
of the sea. It must be examined whether also the ECHR is applicable to these maritime 
zones.  
 
 In the Al-Skeini case109, the Court stated that “jurisdiction under Article 1 is a threshold 
criterion”110 and that “jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the 
State’s territory”.111 As the internal waters and territorial seas are considered under general 
international law to be a natural part of a State’s territory, Article 1 also extends the 
ECHR’s scope of application to the two maritime zones. Thus, coastal states, which are 
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also parties to the ECHR, are bound by the obligations contained in Article 2 of the 
Convention in relation to the maritime zones under consideration here.  
 
As the ECHR is applicable to the maritime territory of the coastal states, the general case 
law developed by the Court when adjudicating other cases concerning the right to life 
might influence the general rights and obligations of the coastal states in these maritime 
zones. Thus, the general principles established by the ECtHR also apply when states are 
faced with threats posed by submarines in these waters.  
 
It must then be examined how the obligations in the ECHR Article 2 affect the State 
parties in the situation under consideration here. 
 
4.2 – Object and purpose of Article 2   
 
Together with the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment in Article 3, the object 
and purpose of Article 2 is to protect the physical integrity and dignity of a person.  The 
ECtHR states that Article 2 “ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the 
Convention” in the Grand Chamber judgment in the Nachova case.112 Evidence of the 
status of Article 2 can also be seen in Article 15(2) of the ECHR, which regulates the 
states’ right to derogate from the Convention in time of war or other public emergency. 
Unless the deprivation of life is justified by lawful acts of war, the very nature of the right 
protected by Article 2 cannot be derogated from.  
 
The reasoning behind the status of Article 2 is that the deprivation of life is one of the 
gravest encroachments on the physical integrity of a person. This is evident since the 
deprivation of life is an irreversible act. Further, the killing of a person affects both the 
family left behind and the society as such. 
 
The ECtHR normally provides the states with a margin of appreciation when they are 
deciding how the obligations in the Convention shall be secured on a national level.113 
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Nevertheless, the ECtHR has declared that ”the domestic margin of appreciation goes hand 
in hand with European supervision”.114 This margin of appreciation also varies due to the 
nature of the right and freedom protected by the Convention. The State naturally has a 
narrower margin of appreciation when the right is of a fundamental character,115 And as 
the right to life “ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention”, 
states are under a special obligation to take measures to protect this right.116 This has also 
been emphasised by the current President of the Court, who has stated that “the margin of 
appreciation is virtually inexistent when it comes to the non-derogable rights”.117 
 
That the ECtHR is provided with the mandate to interpret the ECHR in light of present day 
conditions118 creates an effective and adaptable protection of the substantive rights and 
freedoms contained in the Convention. The “living instrument”-doctrine also affects the 
margin of appreciation of the contracting parties. By taking into consideration the common 
and shared practice of the parties, the margin of appreciation changes as the national 
practices do.  
 
4.3 – The positive and negative obligations contained in Article 2 
 
Article 2 of the ECHR contains both positive and negative obligations. The provision 
places upon the State the positive obligation to protect the right to life, and “[t]his positive 
obligation must be interpreted and applied so that it is “practical and effective””.119 Thus, 
the states are obliged to both prescribe laws prohibiting the deprivation of life and to have 
“an effective judicial system”120 to enforce the prescribed criminal law. The states are 
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under an obligation to effectively take measures to protect the right to life. Furthermore, 
Article 2 can be regarded as an obligation of means.121 
 
The first sentence of Article 2(1) obliges the State to adopt legislation in order to protect 
the right to life. The provision reflects a positive obligation to prevent the deprivation of 
life by both public officials and private individuals. The Court has noticed that positive 
obligations “may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure the respect for 
private life in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves”.122 
 
Article 2 of the ECHR furthermore places upon the states an obligation to refrain from acts 
that may result in the taking of life – a so-called negative obligation. The Article 
emphasises that the State should remain passive and not interfere with the right to life of 
individuals within its jurisdiction. The provision applies to the taking of life by the 
police123, soldiers124, and other state agents125.126  Thus, “Article 2 prohibits the taking of 
life where this is not justified by any of the exceptions permitted by its text”.127 The 
exceptions will be further discussed in chapter 4.4. 
 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to argue that the rules established by the Council of 
Europe reflect those applicable to the rest of the World Society. Article 6 of the UN 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights states that “every human has the inherent right to 
life…[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.128 It can be argued that the wording 
“arbitrarily deprivation” of life must be interpreted to contain the same rights and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Juliet Chevalier-Watts, ”Effective Investigations Under Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Securing the Right to Life or an Onerous Burden on a 
State?” The European Journal of International Law 21 (2010): 701-721, 712.	  
122 X and Y v. The Netherlands, Application no. 8978/80, Chamber judgement of 
26.03.1985, para 23. 
123 Hugh Jordan v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 24746/94, Chamber judgement 
of 04.08.2001.  
124 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Application Nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 
57949/00, Chamber judgement of 06.07.2005.  
125 Avşar v. Turkey. Application No. 25657/94, Chamber Judgement of 10.07.2001. 
126 Harris et al (2014), 221. 
127Id. 
128 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
	   33	  
obligations as those contained in the ECHR Article 2.129 Thus, the contexts included in 
Article 2(2) “probably constitute the sum total of instances in which killing would be 
considered non-arbitrary under the International Convenant on Civil and Political 
Rights”.130  
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3.2, the use of force in the law of the sea requires that 
the force is “necessary” and “reasonable”. It must be examined what the criterion “use of 
force” within the ECHR entails.   
 
4.4 – The prohibition of the use of lethal force 
 
The starting point is that states are under an obligation to safeguard the right to life by 
refraining from unlawful killing at the hands of their agents. Article 2(2) lists three 
situations that would nevertheless justify the taking of life. The list is exhaustive131:  
 
“Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary: 
a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence 
b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained 
c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection” 
 
The wording of the three exceptions does not mention the right of a State to protect itself 
against potential threats or situations concerning national security beyond what is required 
in litra c. It must be examined whether situations mentioned in litra a to c may nevertheless 
be applicable to submarine intrusions. 
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With regard of previous submarine intrusions in states’ internal waters or territorial seas, 
force has typically been used to prevent the escape of the submarine.132 The intention of 
such force is to force the submarine to the surface and not to destroy or sink it. As the 
exceptions contained in Article 2(2) only applies if there is a sufficient “deprivation”, a 
question arises of whether this approach would constitute a “deprivation of life”. In the 
Vasil Sashov Petrov case,133 the Court stated that “if the force was potentially deadly and 
the conduct of the officers concerned was to put the applicant’s life at risk, then Article 2 is 
applicable”.134 As the use of explosives may result in death, specifically for any divers 
operating outside of the submarine, Article 2(2) seems to be applicable in cases concerning 
submarine intrusions.  
 
In light of the exhaustive list contained in the ECHR Article 2(2), however, the ECtHR has 
specifically stated that the taking of life to prevent an escape from a State’s territory is not 
permitted. 135  
 
At one stage of the drafting of the Convention, a fourth situation was actually stipulated. 
This exception would have justified the deprivation of life where force was used to 
prohibit “entry to a clearly defined place to which access is forbidden on grounds of 
national security”,136 but “[t]his wording was finally omitted, so that the taking of life on 
this basis is not allowed”.137 It is thus clear that national security, as the sole reason for the 
use of force cannot justify potentially lethal force against individuals. However, national 
security may in some circumstances be relevant to the exceptions actually mentioned in 
Article 2(2). Thus, “lethal force might, for example, be used in the event of absolute 
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necessity in legitimate defence or to defend a person against violence linked to national 
security”.138  
 
Here, Article 2(2) requires that the “use of force” must be “absolutely necessary”, and it is 
therefore necessary to establish what the term “use of force” entails. 
 
The criterion “use of force” is set forth in Article 2(2) of the ECHR. The term and its scope 
of application are not defined in the Convention itself. However, it is clear that the 
criterion must be viewed in conjunction with the object and purpose of the provision. It is 
thus clear that the “use of force” must be understood in accordance with one of the 
recognized exceptions found in litra a-c.  
 
The Court has stated that the use of firearms139, grenades and explosives140 are considered 
as force in accordance with Article 2(2). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Article 2 
is applicable if the force creates danger to human life.141 Thus, the crucial element in the 
assessment of the applicability of Article 2 is whether the force is potentially deadly.142  
 
The ECHR requires that the “use of force” is applied in accordance with one of the three 
exceptions contained in article 2(2). Thus, “as it arises from the wording of Article 2…the 
use of force must satisfy two conditions: on one hand, it must aim [at] the purposes limited 
set out in paragraph 2…and, on the other hand, it must be absolutely necessary to achieve 
this goal”.143  
 
The Court has given several judgements that make it possible to identify situations where 
the criterion is applicable. The first situation is where death occurs as a consequence of the 
use of force.  
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Interestingly, Article 2 of the ECHR applies to both use of force that leads to the 
intentional and unintentional killing of a person.144 In the McCann case, the Court stated 
that Article 2 “does not primarily define instances where it is permitted intentionally to kill 
an individual, but describes the situations where it is permitted to “use force” which may 
result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life”.145 Thus, the State may be held 
accountable for the loss of life even where the intention was to use non-lethal force, but 
where the outcome was otherwise.  
 
Furthermore, Article 2 also applies in situations where no death occurs as a consequence of 
the force used, but where the outcome could easily have been otherwise.  The Court 
therefore found a violation of the Article in both the Makaratzis case146 and the Saso 
Gorgiev case147, where no deaths occurred.  In both cases, the police used firearms against 
the applicants, who suffered severe injuries. In the former case, the Court stated that “it 
observes, however, that the fact that the latter was not killed was fortuitous”.148 This 
emphasises that if the force is of a potentially lethal character, the threshold of Article 2 is 
reached, as the injuries inflicted in some cases may not meet the criterions under the scope 
of Article 3 of the ECHR.149 Thus, in order to create an effective protection for the 
individuals, such force should be regulated by Article 2.150 
 
Against the background discussed in chapter 4.1, the exception of self-defense contained in 
the ECHR Article 2(2) a) will be further examined. Article 2(2)(b) could also have been 
subject to closer examination, but due to the limited scope of this thesis, litra a will be 
prioritized. The exception found in litra c can hardly be said to be applicable to the 
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scenario of a submarine intrusion and it will thus not be subject to further discussion in this 
thesis.   
 
The right of self-defence or the defence of another is located in ECHR Article 2(2)(a). The 
provision permits the use of force in relation to self-defence of human beings. While not 
stated in the text, this implicitly excludes the defence of property or other material assets. 
This is due to the Convention’s intention being the protection of the rights of individuals.  
Furthermore, litra a differs from litra b and c as it is not expressly stated that the action 
taken must be lawful. However, this can also be “supposed to be the case in respect of 
Article 2(2)(a)“.151  
 
4.5 – The interpretation of  “absolutely necessary” in ECHR Article 2(2) 
 
As in the law of the sea, the criterion of “absolutely necessity” indicates that other 
measures cannot be used to achieve the same results as the use of potentially deadly 
force.152 This emphasises that there must be a direct link between the threat against people 
and the force used in order to invoke the exception in Article 2(2)(a). If an attack is not 
imminent, the Convention thus seems to restrict the right to use force under litra a.153 This 
might place a limitation upon the coastal State when dealing with the threat posed by a 
submerged submarine, as it seems difficult to justify an attack on the basis that it might 
conduct activities that may pose a threat to the people within the jurisdiction of the State. 
On the other hand, submerged passage would seem to indicate that the submarine is at the 
very least trying to avoid the attention of the coastal State.  
 
The interpretation of the criterion “absolutely necessary” must be viewed in conjunction 
with the requirement of proportionality. Thus, “[f]orce is ‘absolutely necessary’ only if it is 
‘strictly proportionate’ to the achievement of a permitted purpose”.154 It must thus be 
examined what the criterion “strictly proportionate” entails and how it affects the right to 
use force.  
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Before establishing the content of the term “strictly proportionate”, it must be recalled that 
the states are not allowed much margin of appreciation under Article 2(2). Thus, “the 
Court makes its own objective assessment of the strict proportionality of the force used”.155  
 
In the case of Article 2(2)(a), the force must thus be strictly proportionate to the aim of 
self-defence or the defence of another. Furthermore, there must be a direct link between 
this legitimate purpose and the means used to achieve the object. The Court has stated that 
there must be “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realised. Thus, the Court finds that it is legitimate to take also into 
account whether the interference envisaged by the State would be an effective means of 
pursuing a legitimate goal”.156 The case concerned an alleged violation of Article 8 of the 
ECHR. As the requirement of Article 8 is simply one of proportionality, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the test of proportionality would be more rigorous under Article 
2(2) where the requirement is that the means must be “strictly proportionate”.   
 
In the Finogenov case, the Court stated that it might depart from the standard of absolutely 
necessity in cases where “its application may be simply impossible where certain aspects 
of the situation lie far beyond the Court’s expertise and where the authorities had to act 
under tremendous time pressure and where their control of the situation was minimal”. 157 
In such exceptional circumstances, a margin of appreciation may also be allowed.158 It 
must be emphasised that the case concerned a hostage situation, where the life of 950 
peoples were at imminent danger. This refers to a more verifiable threat than the scenario 
of a submarine intrusion normally poses to a coastal State.  
 
Further, a State may be held accountable for the loss of human life due to “the actual 
disproportionate use of force or for the planning or control of an operation involving the 
use of force for a purpose permitted by Article 2(2) that does not minimize the risk to life 
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as far as possible”. 159 This was found to be the case in the judgement of the McCann 
case,160 where a strongly divided Court found that Article 2 had been infringed because the 
operation could have been planned and controlled so as to achieve the object without the 
need to kill the suspects.  
 
As in the Law of the Sea, European human rights law requires a prior notification before 
force is actually used. Thus, Turkey was found in violation of Article 2(2) as a 
consequence of “the opening of fire [being] totally unwarranted and not even preceded by 
a warning shot”.161 The criterion “strictly proportionate” may also require a verbal warning 
in addition to the actual warning act.162  
 
The test of proportionality in European human rights law sets forth a threshold for the 
force permitted. That the force must be “strictly proportionate” indicates that the means 
used to achieve the objective of self-defence should not go any further than absolutely 
necessary. Furthermore, the ECHR requires, where it is possible, a prior notification before 
excessive force is used.163  
 
The discussions undertaken in Chapter IV leads me to my main research question. It must 
now be examined whether a coastal State has the right to use potentially lethal force 
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Chapter V – The balance of the Coastal State’s right to protection and the right to life 
of individuals in the case of submarines 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss how the coastal State’s rights in the law of the sea are 
affected by the obligations found in human rights law. The scenario of a submarine 
intrusion will thus be examined in light of the ECHR. Furthermore, the coastal State’s 
choice of means and the scope of force permitted when responding to an intrusion will be 
discussed. Finally, the question of whether a coastal State can use potentially lethal force 
against a submarine found in its internal waters or territorial sea will be answered.  
 
5.1 – Submarine intrusions in light of the ECHR 
 
The ECtHR has seemingly never been faced with a case concerning the response to a 
submarine intrusion under Article 2. Thus, it is somewhat uncertain how the Court would 
apply the obligations contained in Article 2(2) in light of such special circumstances. In the 
Medvedyev case, the Court nevertheless emphasised that it must consider all rules 
applicable, “including those which have their source in international law” when it is faced 
with cases concerning human rights at sea. 164 This statement may indicate that the Court 
will take into account the law developed in the law of the sea where this is natural in the 
circumstances. Thus, the legal regime governing submarines in the law of the sea may be a 
factor when the Court interprets Article 2(2) of the ECHR where a coastal State responds 
to a submarine intrusion.  
 
As described in Chapter 3.3.1, it would seem that a special legal regime has been 
developed in the case of submarines under the law of the sea. This regime enables the 
coastal State to use force in its internal waters and territorial sea without any prior warning 
when it is reacting to a submarine intrusion.165 It must now be examined whether this State 
practice runs counter to Article 2 of the ECHR. 
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On the one hand, it might seem like the use of potentially lethal force would under normal 
circumstances not be justified without any kind of prior notification. The objective of 
Article 2 is to protect the right to life, and when applying the provision, the Court will 
examine whether non-lethal measures could have been used to achieve the objective of the 
operation. In lack of a prior notification, the crew inside the submarine is not given the 
opportunity to stop its activities or leave the area. Another argument is that within the law 
of the sea, the coastal states are subject to obligations in relation to other states, whereas 
when dealing with human rights, the states are under obligations providing rights to 
individuals. As the right to life is the most fundamental right of an individual,166 this 
distinction indicates that the coastal State cannot apply the same approach to a submarine 
intrusion as it could do if the law of the sea was considered an isolated branch of 
international law, outside the reach of human rights.  
 
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine how the Court would apply the requirement of a 
prior notification in light of the special circumstances, as the ECtHR has never been faced 
with a similar case. It must be emphasised that a submarine intrusion, where a submarine is 
likely to engage in activities that may lead to serious injury or death, constitutes an 
extraordinary situation. It seems reasonable to argue that a prior notification might not be 
suitable to remedy the threat that the coastal State is facing in such a situation. 
Furthermore, a prior notification may not be considered as a natural remedy. This is due to 
the fact that it might be hard or impossible to give a prior notification to a submerged 
submarine that is trying to avoid attention from the coastal State. Thus, the conclusion 
must be that the lack of a prior notification would not constitute a violation of the ECHR in 
such cases.  
 
Furthermore, a public statement saying that force will be used if a submarine is posing a 
threat of serious injury or death to people within a State’s territory can be seen as a form of 
a prior notification. The states operating with submarines and their crew will thus be aware 
of the fact that force will be used without a direct warning to the submarine in the specific 
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situation. Furthermore, the use of minor explosives before the coastal State use excessive 
force can also arguably be seen as a prior warning to the submarine.167   
 
As a curiosity, it should be mentioned that Finland applied several depth charges in its 
territorial sea close to its capital Helsinki in April 2015 as a response to what was likely to 
be a submarine intrusion.168 These depth charges were “not intended to damage the target, 
the purpose [was] to let the target know that is has been noticed”.169 Whether the “warning 
act” was used as a prior notification due to Finland’s human rights obligations contained in 
the ECHR or just as a defence act, has not been publically stated.  
 
However, from the perspective of reasonableness, “it would be difficult to accept that 
highly intrusive measures were chosen if other, less harmful means were available”.170 
Thus, the coastal State would still be obliged to choose the less harmful measures, even if a 
prior notification is not required as one of those means. 
 
Furthermore, “the determination as to whether a use of lethal force was ‘absolutely 
necessary’ requires the Court to inquire into the particular circumstances of each claim on 
a case-by-case basis”.171 In the Finogenov case, the Court stated that “the situation 
appeared very alarming”172 and that “there existed a real, serious and immediate risk of 
mass human losses and that the authorities had every reason to believe that a forced 
intervention was the ‘lesser evil’ in the circumstances”.173 Based on these findings, the 
Court found that Russia “did not in the circumstances run counter to Article 2 of the 
Convention” at this point. Thus, “even though the doctrine of margin of appreciation has 
been thought not to apply to Article 2, in fact, the Court’s decision to grant high level of 
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deference to political choices of Contracting states exists because the Court does not feel 
that these decisions are within its capacity to review”.174  
 
It must be emphasised that a submarine intrusion creates an extraordinary situation. If a 
coastal State has credible information establishing that the submarine is engaging in 
activities that may lead to serious injury or death, which create a threat to the people within 
the jurisdiction of the said State, it might find itself in a situation somewhat similar to the 
previously mentioned Finogenov case.175 If the authorities have to act under tremendous 
time pressure and with a minimal control over the situation, the State may be entitled to 
depart from the rigorous standard of “absolutely necessity”.176  The decision to launch an 
attack against a submarine engaging in such activities in the internal waters or the 
territorial sea may arguably qualify as a political choice made under such circumstances.  
 
However, even though a coastal State may find itself in a situation where it has to react to a 
verifiable threat to the life and health of persons under tremendous time pressure and with 
minimal control over the situation, this will not relieve it altogether of its obligation to 
apply the less excessive method.  
 
5.2 – The choice of means and scope of force permitted in the case of submarines 
 
In the case of submarine intrusions in times of peace, the objective of the operation 
initiated by the coastal State is likely to be the verification of activities undertaken and to 
protest to the government to which the submarine belongs. In extreme instances, the 
neutralization of the submarine might be held necessary.177 Earlier measures taken by 
Sweden in the Hårsfjärden incident included the use of metal barriers across the two main 
entrances to Hårsfjärden, through which the submarine might leave the area. 178 The use of 
such measures would seem to be in accordance with the ECHR, as it does not include the 
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use of potentially lethal force to achieve the object. Once a coastal State chooses to deploy 
and use depth charges, the legality of the method under the ECHR may be disputed.  
 
Of special interest in the case of submarines is the fact that the ECHR is applicable even 
where death occurs as an unintended outcome.179 This seems to be the case where a State 
uses force in order to achieve another goal than the taking of life. When a coastal State 
uses force against a submerged submarine in its internal waters or territorial sea, with the 
objective of forcing it up to the surface, the ECHR might be applicable even if the use of 
force leads to the “mere” unintentional killing of the crew and also situations where the 
crew survives but their lives are endangered.  
 
The method used to force a submerged submarine to the surface may include the use of 
depth mines.180 A depth mine is an explosive charge designed to explode underwater at a 
preset depth and which may have different characteristics. Some are designed to totally 
destroy its target, while incident depth charges “are designed to create numerous scattered 
punctures in a submarine’s hull that are not big enough to sink the submarine immediately 
but make immediate repair impossible, so that the submarine is forced to the surface 
without harming the crew”.181  
 
The test of “absolute necessity” entails that the coastal State should at least try less 
intrusive measures before mines are deployed. A natural measure would be trying to 
establish the location of the submarine for the purpose of neutralizing it without the use of 
force. If a submarine is located, the armed forces of the coastal State might be able to 
disarm it by destroying its torpedo’s and stop its activities before a potential attack is 
launched. However, this approach could also pose a risk to the life and health of the crew. 
Other measures could hypothetically also include prevention of the submarine’s 
movements until the crew surrenders. In order to locate a submarine, “sound is the primary 
means”.182 Furthermore, “secondary means (visual observation, radar and signal 
intelligence, as well as magnetic anomalies) depend mainly on detection of snorkelling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See Chapter 4.4. 
180 Sadurska (1984), 37.	  
181 Ibid, 50.  
182 Ralf Lillbacka, ”A Swedish Ebbinghaus Illusion? Submarine Intrusions in Swedish 
Territorial Waters and Possible Soviet Deception,” Intelligence and National Security 25 
(2010): 656-681, 663.  
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masts and periscopes or voluntary transmissions”.183 Another natural measure would be 
trying to establish contact with the submarine. Thus, the coastal State may request it to 
leave the area or surrender. If this measure fails, the State should try to use barriers to 
prevent the escape of the submarine where this is not impossible because of the depth of 
the Fjord.184  
 
The use of depth mines, with the purpose of destroying the hulls of a submarine in order to 
sink it, endangers the life of the crew operating the submarine. If depth mines are used 
only to make small scatters in the hull in order to force the submarine to the surface, the 
situation may be different. However, the abovementioned non-lethal means should be 
applied prior to the use of force. If this approach is applied, the coastal State may be able 
to justify its actions under the ECHR Article 2(2).  
 
When a coastal State finds itself in a situation where it has to act in order to protect the life 
of people located within its territory, Article 2(2) also requires that the operation must be 
carefully planned and controlled. In the case of submarines, this could include prior 
investigation revealing the presumed location of the submarine intruder. Thus, the 
requirements of carefully planning and control will also enable the object of neutralization 
with non-lethal measures. It must be emphasised that in addition to planning and control 
during a specific operation, the coastal states should have generic plans describing the 
methods that should be used in case of submarines entering their internal waters and 
territorial seas and which poses a threat of serious injury or death to the people within its 
territory. Even though the current writer has not been able to identify this requirement in 
the judgements of the ECtHR, this would be in accordance with the requirement that 
operations involving the use of force must be planned and controlled so the risk of loss of 
lives are minimised.185  
 
Against this background, it must be examined whether the use of potentially lethal force 
against a submarine would constitute a violation of the ECHR. Due to the recent submarine 
intrusion in Sweden, it is natural to take a look at the means used by the armed forces of 
Sweden during this particular incident. As Sweden was faced with a submarine intrusion in 
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184 Sweden used metal barriers during the Hårsfjärden incident. See Sadurska (1984), 37.	  
185Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, para 103. 
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October 2014,186 the State that lead the way in the development of customary international 
law concerning the use of force against submarines within the law of the sea,187 found 
itself in a situation where it had to react to the threat posed by a submarine. During this 
incident, the armed forces of Sweden used several measures in order to locate the intruder. 
None of these measures seem to have included the use of potentially lethal force. In the 
aftermath, it seems that the Swedish Government refrained from the use of potentially 
lethal force due to its human rights obligation.188 This resulted in a debate as to whether 
Sweden was entitled to use potentially lethal force despite its obligations under the ECHR. 
The leading Swedish scholar Bring has publically stated that the Swedish Territorial 
Defence Ordinance189 and the ECHR “are different sets of rules that functions in parallel, 
and that the European Convention of Human Rights was never intended to limit the 
military security interests [….] that takes over for the normal human rights obligations that 
functions in the times of peace”. 190  
 
5.3 – May a coastal State use potentially lethal force against a submarine found in its 
internal waters or territorial sea? 
 
The critique of the armed forces of Sweden in the aftermath of the 2014 incident is mainly 
based on the argument that the ECHR was never intended to limit the military security 
interest of the member states. Thus, it must be examined whether the ECHR can be seen as 
an instrument limiting the coastal states right to use potentially lethal force against 
submarines. 
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187 See Chapter 3.3.1. 
188 However, the Swedish government has not given any public statement regarding the 
means that was used to locate the submarine and how the ECHR affected the choice of 
means in the operation. See Annex I.  
189 The Ordinance ”is the national legislation which authorizes the armed forces to defend 
the Swedish Geographic Territory in peacetime.” This includes the sea territory of Sweden. 
See Victoria Ekstedt,, ”Is the Swedish Territorial Defence applicable on the fourth arena?” 
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As the alternative where force is used to prohibit “entry to a clearly defined place to which 
access is forbidden on grounds of national security”191 was omitted in the final draft,192 it 
would seem that the member states intended to limit the legal uses of force in situations 
regarding national security. Arguably, it could be argued that the exception was omitted 
because it was considered to be “consumed” by the three other exceptions in Article 2(2), 
but this seems doubtful.193 Furthermore, that the list of exceptions included in Article 2(2) 
is considered exhaustive argues against force being used solely on the basis of national 
security.  
 
Also, the status which the ECtHR has granted the right to life indicates that the Court 
would probably not feel bound by a potential consensus existing between the Parties 
regarding the use of force in 1950. This is a consequence of the “living instrument-
doctrine” first introduced in the Tyrer case.194 As conditions have changed over time, the 
Court could be expected to interpret Article 2 in a dynamic way, in light of the present-day 
conditions. Thus, the conclusion must be that the fundamental character of Article 2 
constitutes a limitation on the coastal state’s right to use potentially lethal force against 
submarines. 
 
With the strict requirements established under the ECHR, it seems doubtful that a coastal 
State can use potentially lethal force against a foreign submarine without applying non-
lethal measures to achieve to object beforehand. The only potential exception would be if 
the coastal State finds itself in a situation similar to the previously mentioned Finogenov 
case.195 However, the coastal State has to apply the less excessive method to achieve its 
object of neutralization. Furthermore, the Court has less inclined here to accept  a 
weakening of the human rights due to the serious situations which the states are facing.196 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 B.G Ramcharan, ”The Drafting History of Article 2 of the European Convention on 
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192 Council of Europe, Collected edition of the «Travaux préparatoires» of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Vol V, 120-122. 
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This is evident due to several cases decided on the basis of the non-international armed 
conflict in Chechnya.197 
 
It seems reasonable to argue that a coastal State faced with a submarine intrusion is obliged 
to refrain from the use of force. The reasoning behind this is that the object of 
neutralization, in order to protect the people within its jurisdiction, can be achieved without 
the use of force.198 It must be emphasised that the situation in the Finogenov case199 left the 
Russian Authorities with no other choice than using gas and storming the building, as the 
negotiations with the separatists broke down. In the case of a submarine intrusion, the 
coastal State would often be able to apply non-lethal measures to achieve its objective of 
neutralization. Furthermore, the case of a submarine intrusion differs from the situation in 
the Finogenov case,200 because the Russian authorities had reliable information confirming 
that the life of the 950 hostages were in imminent danger. When a coastal State is faced 
with a submarine intrusion, this particular element seems to be missing. Even though it can 
be assumed that a submerged submarine is engaged in activities that may lead to serious 
injury or death, the submerged mode cannot automatically be said to constitute an 
immediate threat to the people within the Coastal State’s territory. Thus, the coastal State 
would presumably not be able to invoke the exception of self-defence contained in the 
ECHR Article 2(2)(a) under such circumstances. The only potential exception would be if 
the coastal State has credible information confirming that the submarine is preparing an 
imminent attack on individuals, or which would otherwise directly expose individuals to 
life-threatening situations. It seems reasonable to conclude that the threshold for the use of 
force in such situations would be high, and that this naturally constitutes a narrow 
exception. On the other hand, if the coastal State is in possession of intelligence about an 
immediate attack from another State, the law of armed conflicts would be applicable.  
 
Against the discussion undertaken in this chapter, it can be concluded that a coastal State 
cannot normally use potentially lethal force against a submarine found in its internal waters 
or territorial sea without violating the ECHR article 2.  
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It can also be argued that the strict requirements, which regulate the use of force in the 
ECHR, set forth a higher threshold for the use of force than the Law of the Sea in 
situations concerning submarine intrusions. This is evident by the fact that the right to use 
force in the Law of the Sea seems to be wider when a State uses force against a submarine 
than another type of vessel.201 A State that is a party the ECHR would nevertheless also be 
bound by its provisions, even though the rules established in the Law of the Sea seems to 
have a wider margin. Thus, the coastal states bound by both sets of rules cannot use the 
customary international law established in the Law of the Sea to rectify a violation of the 
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Chapter VI – Conclusion  
 
6.1 – Concluding remarks 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to establish whether a coastal State has the right to 
use potentially lethal force against submarines in its internal waters and its territorial sea. 
Against this background, several observations have been made.  
 
First, the regulations on the use of force in the Law of the Sea requires that the force must 
be “necessary”, “reasonable” and “unavoidable”. Thus, the requirement of “necessity” 
emphasises that the circumstances must be serious and that other measures cannot be used 
to achieve the same results as the use of force. Furthermore, that the requirement of 
“necessity” includes the use of a prior notification before force is used. The criterion of 
reasonableness points towards an assessment of proportionality, and indicates that in 
situations where force is considered as a necessary means, it might nevertheless fail to be 
reasonable.202 The criterion requiring that the force must be “unavoidable” indicates that 
all other reasonable measures must be implied before the use of force would be justified. 
 
Second, the abovementioned criteria’s seems to be modified when a coastal State is 
responding to a submarine intrusion in its internal waters and territorial sea. Due to the 
lack of protests against the Swedish Ordinance of Defence adopted in 1982,203 it might 
seem that customary international law regarding the use of force against submarines has 
developed. The Swedish legislation provides for the use of force against submarines with 
no requirement of a prior notification. Thus, the criterion requiring that the force must be 
“necessary” and “unavoidable”, as developed in the Law of the Sea seems to be modified. 
Hence, the threshold for the use of force against a submerged submarine is lower than 
against other foreign vessels located in the internal waters and territorial sea of a coastal 
State.  
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Third, the individual right to life under the European Convention on Human Rights obliges 
the State Parties to safeguard the right to life by refraining from unlawful killings at the 
hands of their agents. However, in accordance with Article 2(2)(a) of the ECHR, the use of 
potentially lethal force may be justified if the force is used in “defence of any person from 
unlawful violence”. Such force must be “absolutely necessary” to be in accordance with 
the exception contained in the ECHR Article 2(2)(a). The assessment of “strict 
proportionality” requires a prior notification under normal circumstances. However, when 
a coastal State is responding to a submarine intrusion, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the requirement of a prior notification may be departed from, as this does not seem to be a 
natural means under such extraordinary circumstances. Thus, the potentially customary 
international law that seems to have developed in the case of submarines within the Law of 
the Sea seems to be in accordance with the human rights obligations contained in the 
ECHR Article 2(2). 
 
Finally, it seems reasonable to argue that the conclusion of the primary research question 
in this thesis must be that a coastal State cannot use potentially lethal force against a 
submarine found in its internal waters or in its territorial sea. This is due to the fact that the 
objective of neutralization, in order to protect the people within its territory in accordance 
with the ECHR Article 2(2)(a), may often be achieved with the use of non-lethal measures. 
Furthermore, submerged passage in these maritime zones cannot automatically be said to 
pose an immediate threat to the people within the coastal State’s territory, even though it 
can be assumed that it is engaging in activities that may lead to serious injuries or death. 
Thus, the use of force against a submarine under such circumstances would seemingly 
constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In light of the concluding remarks of this thesis, there might be a need for a global 
dialogue concerning the use of force against submarines.  
 
As customary international law seemed to develop in the aftermath of the Swedish 
submarine intrusions in the 1980s, this raises the question of whether there is now a need 
for a codification of the customary rules and principles applicable to the use of force 
against submerged submarines found in a Coastal State’s internal waters or territorial sea. 
A decisive factor in this discussion will be the willingness of the states that possesses large 
fleets of submarines and submarine weapons to participate in such a discussion. It seems 
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doubtful that particularly the US, Russia and also China would be interested in a 
codification of the rules and principles applicable to submarines. This view is also 
supported by Von Heinegg, who argue that “ those states whose interests are specifically 
affected…will either remain absent or refuse to become a party”204 to a potential treaty. 
Thus, one might argue that “any codification would, at best, be counterproductive”.205 
 
Even though it doesn’t seem like there will be any possibility for codification of the 
relevant rules at present, this might be a possible scenario in the future. Bearing in mind 
the recent submarine incidents in both Sweden and Finland, the security interests of the 
coastal states’ may nevertheless lead the way to a further debate concerning the rules 
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ANNEX	  II	  –	  LETTER	  FROM	  THE	  SWEDISH	  MINISTRY	  OF	  DEFENCE	  (Translated	  by	  






Thank	  you	  for	  your	  letter	  regarding	  the	  IKFN-­‐Ordinance.	  
	  
	  
The	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Sweden	  conducted	  the	  information	  operation	  in	  the	  Stockholm	  
archipelago	  in	  October	  2014.	  The	  government	  does	  not	  comment	  on	  details	  of	  the	  
authorities’	  operations.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  no	  public	  statement	  given	  by	  the	  government	  
regarding	  the	  means	  applied	  by	  the	  armed	  forces	  in	  the	  information	  operation.	  	  
	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  Swedish	  constitution,	  the	  government	  is	  not	  permitted	  to	  decide	  
how	  an	  authority	  should	  apply	  the	  applicable	  law.	  The	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  is	  law	  in	  Sweden.	  The	  
government	  has	  thus	  also	  neither	  commented	  on	  the	  question	  about	  how	  the	  armed	  






Biträdande	  chef	  för	  enheten	  för	  militär	  förmåga	  och	  insatser	  
	  
	  
